JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1999


In This Issue:

U.S. Wins Panel Decision On Canadian Dairy Practices by Randy Green
Crop Insurance: Some Basics by Stephen Frerichs
Updated House and Senate Committee Member and Staff Lists



U.S. WINS PANEL DECISION ON CANADIAN DAIRY PRACTICES

by Randy Green

On March 17, a World Trade Organization panel ruled in favor of a United States complaint against Canadian dairy export subsidies and import barriers. The U.S., acting at the request of several dairy industry groups, had challenged Canada's practices and has now won a victory, though one that will not be complete until Canadian policies actually change. The panel's ruling sets important precedents for interpreting the Uruguay Round's export subsidy reforms. This article examines the case and summarizes the panel's findings and reasoning.

Complainants: The United States and New Zealand initiated the complaint against Canadian export practices and (in the case of the U.S.) Canada's import restrictions on fluid milk and cream.

Context: Developments in U.S. dairy policy during the 1980s and 1990s have made international trade a more significant consideration for the industry than in the past. Price support levels have been steadily reduced and price supports are scheduled to expire altogether under terms of the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996. Export subsidies, primarily the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), have facilitated the export of U.S. dairy products but have not always been utilized to the extent desired by the industry. Exports of U.S. dairy products have grown to almost $1 billion in 1998.

Time Line: This case illustrates that even under the Uruguay Round's reforms to dispute settlement procedures, a substantial amount of time can expire between the beginning and the end of a case. Here are some of the milestones in the history of the dispute:

U.S. dairy industry spokespersons believe Canada will exercise its right to appeal the decision in the final report, and expect the appeal process to conclude by mid-summer, followed by establishment of a timetable for Canada to implement the decision. In a statement, Canadian ministers held out the possibility of an appeal but also promised to honor Canada's international obligations "whatever the final outcome."

Canadian Dairy Policy: Canada's dairy policy comprises production quotas, administered support prices and border protection. Both federal and provincial governments are involved in the regulation of trade in dairy products, with international trade coming under federal jurisdiction. Import tariffs and tariff quotas are restrictive; for instance, bound rates of duty on milk and products in 2000 will generally range from 200 to nearly 300 percent ad valorem, with specified per-kilogram minimum tariffs. As in the United States, milk pricing in Canada involves a system of classification according to intended use, as well as the pooling of sales proceeds.

Practices at Issue: Both export and import practices in Canada were at issue in this case.

Export Subsidies: The United States and New Zealand claimed that certain export sales under "Class 5" of Canada's milk classification scheme constitute subsidized exports in excess of Canada's Uruguay Round export subsidy volume commitments. In particular, the countries' complaints center on --

Prices for products in these classes are substantially lower than the corresponding products in domestic Canadian channels. For example, the average January-June 1997 price of Class 3(b) cheddar cheese for the domestic market was $50.40 per hectoliter, while the Class 5(e) price for cheddar cheese was $25.23.

The U.S. claim (largely joined by New Zealand) was that these policies --

(1) constitute either
(a) export subsidies under Article 9.1 of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture or
(b) export subsidies not listed in Article 9.1 which circumvent Canada's export subsidy commitments in violation of Article 10.1,

and in either case should be counted against Canada's export subsidy reduction commitments;

(2) result in violations of Canada's commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture, specifically Article 8, which forbids WTO members to subsidize exports other than in conformity with the Agreement and their commitments; Article 3.3, which prohibits subsidies listed in Article 9.1 beyond the budgetary and quantity commitments made by each member, or on products not specified in those commitments; and Article 10.1, the prohibition on circumvention listed above; and

(3) violate the general prohibition on export subsidies in Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.

Import Limits: The U.S. claimed that Canada violates its UR commitments by the way it has implemented a 64,500 ton tariff rate quota (TRQ) on fluid milk. Canada has allowed only entries of consumer-packaged milk, valued at C$20 or less, for personal use by Canadians. Canada claims to justify this practice by reference to its UR schedule, which says the 64,500 tons "represents the estimated annual cross-border purchases imported by Canadian consumers."

Products at Issue: The dairy products exported are butter, cheese and "other milk products." The years at issue are 1995/96 and 1996/97. The product involved in the import complaint is fluid milk.

The Export Subsidy Issue: The U.S. and New Zealand claimed that dairy products exported under Classes 5(d) and (e) are subsidized because processors are given access to milk at prices lower than those applying to milk for the manufacture of the same products for domestic consumption. They challenged the government involvement in this scheme, including the governmentally-imposed pooling of the relatively low returns from Class 5(d) and some Class 5(e) exports with higher domestic market returns.

The Panel's Reasoning and Findings: Under the structure of the relevant UR agreements, Canada acknowledged that its actual exports exceeded the nation's reduction commitment levels for both years, though Canada claimed that the excess amounts were not subsidized and therefore did not violate its obligations. Under this circumstance, however, the UR put the burden on Canada to show that the exports were not subsidized, rather than placing the burden of an affirmative showing on the U.S. and New Zealand.

The panel found that –

(1) Class 5(d) and (e) exports constitute an export subsidy under Article 9.1(a), "the provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, to a cooperative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board, contingent on export performance". The panel reasoned that by allowing processors/exporters to obtain milk at a price significantly lower than the domestic milk price and on terms and conditions more favorable than those available for any alternate source such as an import for re-export, the policy confers a benefit – the provision of a good at a discounted price, constituting a payment in kind. The panel also found that the benefit was provided by Canada's governments or their agencies, citing the critical roles of the Canadian Dairy Commission and provincial milk marketing boards.

(2) Class 5(d) and (e) exports also constitute an export subsidy under Article 9.1(c), "payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is involved, including payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the exported product is derived". Paralleling its finding on 9.1(a), the panel determined that the Canadian policies do constitute a "payment," that this payment is conditioned "on the export of an agricultural product" and that it is "financed by virtue of governmental action."

(3) Therefore, Canada is violating its UR quantity commitment levels, contrary to its obligations under Article 3.3.

(4) Further, if – and only if – the Class 5(d) and (e) exports were not export subsidies under Article 9.1(a) and (c), they would still constitute a circumvention (in violation of Article 10) of Canada's quantity commitment levels, because they qualify as an export subsidy under Paragraph (d) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies that forms an annex to the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, which the panel used to determine whether they are "subsidies contingent upon export performance" under Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture.

(5) Since Canada is in violation of Article 3.3, it has also acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 8.

(6) Given what it called "minimal" U.S. arguments to justify the claim of a violation of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, the panel did not examine that issue.

Import Limits: The panel found that –

(1) Neither the C$20 limit on fluid milk entries nor the limitation of these entries to consumer-packaged milk for personal use can reasonably be derived from Canada's reference in its UR schedule to the equivalence of the 64,500 ton quota to "the estimated annual cross-border purchases imported by Canadian consumers."

(2) For that reason, Canada's restrictions are inconsistent with obligations under Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994.

Panel Recommendation: The panel recommended that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body request Canada to bring both its export marketing regime and its fluid milk TRQ into conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture and GATT 1994, respectively.

Implications: The panel noted that this was "the first case brought before a panel which involves the substantive provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture relating to export subsidies." Clearly, the panel was alert to the dangers that WTO members could avoid their responsibilities to reduce export subsidies by an overly narrow reading of what in fact constitutes an export subsidy. Export subsidies do not suddenly lose their character as subsidies, for example, because they involve ostensibly non-governmental entities that nevertheless enjoy powers specially granted by statute. Moreover, the panel's willingness to consider Article 10 circumvention as an alternative to Article 9.1 shows that, if future panels follow the precedents established by this one, the scope of practices subject to reduction commitments will be inclusive rather than narrow.

Since Canada's current export regime dates only to 1995 and was modified in the wake of its UR commitments, U.S. dairy industry spokespersons correctly pointed out that the decision may discourage other nations from attempting to circumvent their own obligations. Similar considerations would apply to the ruling on the fluid milk TRQ. In this case, the decision's importance may overshadow the actual quantities involved. The administration of TRQs has emerged as an issue which several nations and interest groups believe should be further addressed in negotiations on agriculture to be launched after a November 30-December 3, 1999, WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle.

The panel did not find that all two-price systems are per se export subsidies. The panel said "In our view, in particular the existence of parallel markets for domestic use and for export with different prices does not necessarily constitute an export subsidy." In a footnote, the panel cited the case where domestic prices are above world prices because of an import tariff but producers choose to sell some product into the world market at a lower price. Here, though, the panel stressed that the decision to make such a sale must be "one made by the individual producer and based on commercial grounds only ... not a decision by the government or its agencies taken on behalf of the producers ..."

The panel decision may also raise some interesting questions about the U.S. peanut program. The peanut program involves a national production goal, like the Canadian dairy system. Like the Canadian system, it facilitates a pricing system that varies by the end use of the product – a much higher support rate for quota peanuts, which are eligible for "domestic edible use," and a lower one for non-quota or "additional" peanuts, which generally must be exported or crushed. Though the peanut program depends heavily on the use of cooperative area marketing associations, these have a clear statutory basis and derive their powers from the government -- as is the case for various entities in the Canadian dairy sector cited in the panel decision. The exporter of additional peanuts, like the Canadian exporter of dairy products, can obtain the exported commodity at a price lower than the domestic price of the same commodity.

The parallels are not exact – additional peanuts have some permissible uses other than being exported; there are distinctions among quota and additional growers that may not fit the fact pattern in the panel decision – but with new WTO talks approaching, they are worth some attention.

The panel's ruling constitutes a victory for the United States. Implementation of its findings, of course, will be critical. Yet in contrast to long-running and seemingly intractable disputes like the U.S.-European beef hormone case or the imbroglio over bananas, the Canadian dairy case may serve to increase confidence in the WTO dispute settlement process rather than decrease it, and to encourage real reform of export subsidies and other practices.



CROP INSURANCE: SOME BASICS

by Stephen Frerichs

Crop insurance is currently the hottest topic being debated in farm policy circles. Reform of crop insurance has been highlighted as a major priority by both the Clinton Administration and congressional leaders. In an effort to assist people in understanding the crop insurance program better, we offer the following background information which describes the basic elements of the program.

Crop insurance is an insurance product. Farmers choose how much insurance they want and how they want the policy structured. Like most insurance policies, there are many options and the choices can be confusing. Unlike other insurance products, however, the basic policy provisions for the crop insurance program are set by the Federal Government.

WHY IS THE GOVERNMENT INVOLVED?

Crop losses tend to be correlated. When drought strikes it will generally impact a large geographic area. Car accidents or health problems, on the other hand, generally are independent, random events. If person A dies of a heart attack, this does not necessarily mean that his or her neighbor will suffer the same fate. The correlation of crop losses increases premiums for farmers and for many years prevented the commercial development of multi-peril policies as the policy must account for this systemic risk. For companies, the correlation of losses means that capital requirements are higher in order to maintain adequate reserves to cover wide-spread losses. Generally, when a single event occurs that results in multiple losses, insurers refer to the event as a catastrophe. In crop insurance, catastrophic losses are the norm rather than the exception.

On the other hand, a private market without Federal involvement has existed for crop hail and fire insurance for over a century. Losses from hail generally are not correlated across wide geographic areas. More recently, the correlation of loss phenomena has generated calls for Federal assistance in other lines of property and casualty insurance, namely for hurricane (after Hurricane Andrew) and earthquake (after Northridge) insurance. As those parts of the U.S. more prone to these events have become ever more populated, the cost of insurance has risen dramatically for these types of risk.

Finally, production risk varies significantly across the country. Without federal involvement in the crop insurance program, high risk production areas would have significantly fewer affordable risk management options. Federal policy makers have decided over the years that these areas should be afforded the same types of insurance coverage, with even greater subsidies, as low risk production areas. As a result, policy makers have determined that a federally subsidized risk management program is a proper role for the Federal Government.

WHAT IS MULTIPLE PERIL CROP INSURANCE?

Multiple Peril Crop insurance, or MPCI, is the crop insurance plan developed and rated by the USDA. MPCI is sometimes also called "yield insurance" or APH (Actual Production History) insurance. MPCI is delivered by private insurance companies and agents. MPCI protects against yield losses. Indemnity payments are made if actual production is below the yield guaranteed in the insurance policy.

WHAT TYPE OF LOSS DOES MPCI COVER?

As the name implies, multiple-peril crop insurance (MPCI) protects against losses from multiple perils. The specific perils vary by commodity but generally include: (a) adverse weather conditions; (b) fire; (c) insects, but not damage due to insufficient or improper application of pest control measures; (d) plant disease, but not damage due to insufficient or improper application of disease control measures; (e) wildlife; (f) earthquake; (g) volcanic eruption; or (h) failure of the irrigation water supply if due to an unavoidable cause of loss occurring within the insurance period. Hail and fire coverage may be excluded from the covered causes of loss for a crop policy only if private hail and fire coverage is selected. Losses resulting from the inability to plant (prevented planting) are also covered if due to adverse weather. MPCI stands in contrast to a single or named peril policy that would cover only those perils named in the policy such as hail.

WHAT IS ACTUAL PRODUCTION HISTORY?

Actual production history or APH is the farmer's yield history for the unit to be insured. It forms the backbone of the MPCI program. The APH is used to determine the grower's premium rate as well as the grower's yield guarantee. Farmers prove their yields. The APH is a simple average of 4 – 10 years of historical yields for the unit that is insured.

If farmers do not have 4 years of yield records, a yield is assigned to the farmer. This yield is commonly called the "t-yield" or transition yield. The "t-yield" is generally the county average yield for the crop (generally this is based on the last ten years of data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service). If growers have no records but have grown the crop in the past two years, they are assigned a yield equal to 65 percent of the t-yield. With one year of records, growers are assigned a yield equal to 80 percent of the t-yield. Two years of records brings 90 percent of the t-yield and three years of records result in an assignment of the t-yield for the fourth year. In these cases, the one to three actual yields are averaged with the t yields.

Changes in the APH (a rolling simple average) are "cupped" and "capped" from one year to the next. The "cup" or downward limit on the APH is 10% of the previous APH . This means that a grower's APH cannot drop by more than 10% from one year to the next. In addition, if farmers have four or more yield records, their APH is not allowed to fall below 80% of the t yield. The "cap" or upward limit on the APH is 20% of the previous APH. This means that a grower's APH cannot increase by more than 20% from one year to the next.

WHAT ARE "UNITS"?

Units determine the size of the acreage to be insured. Generally, the larger the size of a unit, the lower the premium. There are four unit structures: (1) basic, (2) optional, (3) enterprise county crop, and (4) whole farm which combines multiple crops in the county.

The basic unit is determined by ownership of the commodity produced on the land to be insured in a county. Cash rent and owned land are generally considered one basic unit, while share cropped arrangements result in multiple basic units within the county. For example, if a farmer owns 500 acres, cash rents another 500 acres, and share crops another 400 acres, the farmer has two basic units (one basic unit of 1000 acres and one of 400).

Optional units are subdivided basic units. Generally, optional units must be in separate sections or section equivalents. Farmers must keep separate records for each optional unit. Smaller units are advantageous for farmers if their land's production capacity is variable. Poorer producing land can be separated from better producing land for example. Optional units are popular. In 1998, there are 1.2 million policies and 2.7 million units. Optional units include a rate surcharge above the basic unit and are available only on coverage levels that exceed the catastrophic coverage.

In some cases, farmers are able to choose a unit structure that aggregates land further than a basic unit. An "enterprise" unit includes all shares of a crop in the county. This would aggregate share-cropped land with land owned and/or cash rented. Enterprise units are available on revenue insurance plans and were pilot tested on MPCI in 1998. A "whole farm" unit, available only on certain revenue insurance policies aggregates all shares of insured crops farmed in the county. The advantage of these larger unit structures are significantly reduced premiums.

WHAT KIND OF YIELD COVERAGE IS AVAILABLE?

Farmers are able to insure their expected production. The MPCI guarantees a certain production amount for each acre planted. The guarantee is the product of the farmer's APH and the coverage level that the farmer selects. Coverage levels are available in increments of 5% at levels between 50% and 85% of APH. The coverage level sets the farmers' deductible. If 65% coverage is elected, for example, the deductible is 35%. This means that any loss greater than 35% will result in an indemnity payment. The first 35% of loss, however, is not covered by the insurance policy. Farmers can elect coverage by crop and county. Coverage levels cannot vary at the unit level for the crop insured. In 1998, over 90% of the crop insurance policies carried a deductible of 35 percent or greater.

WHAT KIND OF PRICE COVERAGE IS AVAILABLE?

USDA sets a pre-determined maximum price for each commodity each year. Farmers can select a price level between 55 percent and 100 percent of the USDA established price. Most farmers elect the maximum price. USDA sets the price early (before planting) so that farmers and lenders know what the policy guarantees. In addition, insurance companies need to know their total exposure, which drives their capital requirements. Because the price is set well in advance of harvest, it almost always is not equal to market price.

WHAT IS 50/60 or 65/100?

The shorthand expression of the yield and price guarantee is stated as the percent of yield, for example 65 percent, and price, for example 100 percent. This would commonly be expressed as 65/100. A 50/60 policy is a 50 percent yield combined with a 60 percent price guarantee.

WHAT IS LIABILITY?

The per acre liability is equal to: APH multiplied by Coverage level and Price. The liability determines the maximum guarantee. For example, assume a soybean farmer who elects a 65 percent coverage level, has an APH of 50 bu/ acre, and elects 100% of the pre-established USDA price for soybeans ($5.25 in 1999). The liability is 50*0.65*$5.25 or $171 per acre. This is the most the farmer can expect to be paid per acre, assuming a total loss.

WHAT IS PREMIUM?

The premium is the amount the producer pays for the insurance protection. The premium is a proportion of the liability and is determined by multiplying the liability by a premium rate.

The MPCI rates are set by USDA. The average rate is based on the historical loss experience of crop insurance participants growing the crop in the county. This average rate becomes the basis for determining an individual farmer's premium rate. Around the average rate, USDA has calculated several different risk levels, call R-spans. The R-spans reflect different ranges of yields and growing practices (irrigated versus non-irrigated). Lower than average yields are assumed to be more risky and receive a higher rate. Higher than average yields are assumed to be less risky and receive a lower rate. An individual farmer's APH determines which R-span the farmer is in and the corresponding rate. The premium is adjusted for unit size.

For example, in 1998, soybean rates in Robeson County, North Carolina at the 65 percent coverage level ranged from 45.7 percent at the R-1 span (APH of 11 bu. or less) to 10.5 percent at the R-9 span (APH of 35 and above). These rates are for optional units and would be multiplied by the farmer's liability to determine the premium amount. The R-5 span is the county average.

WHAT IS CATASTROPHIC AND BUY-UP COVERAGE?

Catastrophic coverage is the lowest level of coverage available. Beginning in 1999 catastrophic coverage is 50/55 coverage. It was 50/60 coverage in from 1995 - 1998. Buy-up coverage is considered coverage equal to or greater than 50/100 coverage.

Generally, the policy provisions are the same for catastrophic and buy-up coverage. Optional units are not available for catastrophic coverage and the Federal subsidies vary significantly between the two. Farmers pay no premium for catastrophic coverage. They pay a $60 per policy administrative fee instead. Farmers do pay a portion of the premium for buy-up policies.

WHAT DO AGENTS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES DO?

If the USDA sets the rates and determines the policy parameters, what does the private sector do? Private industry has been involved in the crop insurance program since 1981. It has been the exclusive delivery mechanism for the program since 1997. There are over 14,000 agents and 17 companies involved in the program today.

Insurance agents are the sales force for the program. Agents interact with farmers, helping the farmer choose the insurance instrument and coverage level that is most appropriate. They calculate the farmer's APH, provide the premium quotes for the policy, answer questions, and notify the company in an event of loss. Insurance companies do not directly market policies to farmers. All policies are sold through an agent. In addition, most agents sell other types of insurance and financial products (annuities for example) other than crop insurance.

The insurance companies deliver the program. Their functions include, but are not limited to: hiring and training agents, paying for marketing and advertising, hiring and training loss adjusters and carrying-out loss adjustment activity, billing and collecting premiums, processing and verifying applications, conducting APH reviews, processing and verifying acreage reports, paying claims, auditing and verifying claims data, processing and sending 1099 forms to farmers and the IRS, paying uncollected premiums, and maintaining the necessary automated data processing infrastructure to communicate data with USDA on a routine basis.

The policy a farmer buys is a contract between the insured and the insurance company, not the Federal Government. The policy (commonly referred to as "paper") is private paper, not Federal. In order for the farmer to receive the Federal subsidy attached to the program, the private insurance policy must follow the Federal standards and rates. But the policy itself is a private policy. For this reason, all premiums are owed to and guaranteed by the insurance companies. The Federal Government is not involved in the collection of delinquent debt (premiums owed). In addition, the private insurance companies bear the risk associated with the policies, even though they do not set the rates. Like many insurance companies, crop insurance companies have reinsurance agreements to transfer risk to other private companies known as reinsurers. Unlike most other insurance lines, the private insurance companies also transfer some of the risk associated with the crop insurance program directly to the Federal Government.

WHAT IS REINSURANCE AND WHY DOES THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDE IT?

Reinsurance provided by the Federal Government and private reinsurance companies is a critical component of the Federal crop insurance program. Reinsurance is risk transfer. Insurance companies transfer risk to other companies who are willing to bear risk, but are not necessarily interested in administering an insurance policy. Insurance companies may seek to transfer risk for a variety of reasons. In the Federal crop insurance program, there are three primary reasons. First, an insurance company may be writing policies in a high risk area where it would normally choose not to operate but must according to the agreement it has with the Federal Government. For example, USDA requires a crop insurance company to write all policies in all geographic areas of a State once it chooses to operate in that State. Second, companies may not have sufficient capital to cover all potential losses. The correlated nature of losses associated with farming requires insurance companies to seek reinsurance for catastrophic losses. Third, an insurance company may not agree with USDA that the premium rates set by USDA accurately reflect the risk in the area. It may therefore choose to transfer the risk of inaccurate rating back to USDA.

An insurance company analyzes its book of business, determines where its exposure is higher than it is capable or willing to underwrite and seeks reinsurance for that part of its business. In effect, the insurance company is buying insurance. Generally, the reinsurer will pay a commission or ceding commission to the insurer. The commission is designed to reimburse the insurer for the reinsurer's share of the acquisition costs (brokerage fees for example), as well as covering the insurer's other costs, such as administrative expenses.

USDA offers reinsurance through the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA). In 1998 there are 17 SRA holders, that is, insurance companies that have signed the SRA with the USDA. USDA offers two basic kinds of reinsurance: pro-rata (proportional) and excess of loss or stop loss reinsurance. The terms and conditions of both are found in the SRA.

The pro-rata reinsurance terms of the SRA have evolved over the years. Today, the SRA provides three separate "pools" or "funds" of reinsurance that reflect varying degrees of risk sharing to the companies. The three funds are the assigned risk, developmental and commercial fund. A company may cede business directly to USDA, which means that the USDA bears all of the risk for the business ceded or the company may retain the liability (risk). Retention is fixed within pools and states. Companies must retain at least 35 percent of their business nationwide. For example, 88 percent of the premium was retained in Iowa in 1998, while 74 percent of the premium was retained by the companies in Texas in 1998.

The premium that a company retains may be assigned to the three risk sharing funds. The three funds contain different stop loss agreements. Broadly speaking, an assignment to the assigned risk fund means that USDA will bear most of the risk for a policy, whereas an assignment to the commercial fund means that private industry accepts more of the risk. The developmental fund is in-between the assigned risk and commercial funds in terms of the risk sharing arrangement. There are separate funds for catastrophic policies (50/55 coverage beginning in 1999) and for revenue policies.

USDA places various cession limits on how much can be placed in the assigned risk fund. For example, 75 percent of the business in Texas, Alaska, Georgia, Maine, and Montana can be placed to the assigned risk . In Iowa 15 percent of the business can be placed in the assigned risk fund. In Illinois, Indiana, and Kansas 20 percent of the business can be placed in the assigned risk fund. USDA also requires that a company retain at least 35 percent of its nationwide book of business.

In addition, the companies "lay-off" additional risk with private reinsurers. Again, the majority of these reinsurance agreements are pro-rata or quota share and stop loss agreements.

HOW DOES THE SUBSIDY WORK AND WHAT DOES THE PROGRAM COST

As mentioned above, the Federal Government provides two basic subsidies for farmers. It subsidizes premium costs and it provides reinsurance for high risk production areas (the assigned risk pool). The reinsurance is discussed above. The premium subsidy is separated by statute into two components: 1) subsidy of the premium associated with production risk and 2) an administrative and operating subsidy paid by the government to insurance companies on behalf of the farmer.

The 1999 administrative payment is 24.5 percent of the total premium associated with the production risk. This compares to a payment of 27 percent in 1998, 29 percent in 1997, and 31 percent in 1996. For example, if the total premium without administrative expenses is $100, then the administrative payment is $24.50. Administrative payments are not made for catastrophic insurance policies (50/55 coverage in 1999, 50/60 coverage in 1998). Farmers pay a $60 fee for catastrophic insurance coverage. The fee is remitted to USDA and helps offset the cost of the overall program. USDA does make a loss adjustment payment for catastrophic insurance policies to the companies, equal to 11% of the imputed premium (recall there is no premium paid for CAT, but premium is calculated).

The subsidy structure for the premium associated with the risk portion of the insurance policy varies by coverage level. Catastrophic policies are fully subsidized. For all policies with less than 65/100 coverage, the premium subsidy is equal to catastrophic coverage (50/55 in 1999, 50/60 in 1998). In 1998 this worked out on average to roughly a 60% premium subsidy at the 50/100 level, 50% at the 55/100 level and 41% at the 60/100 level.

For all policies equal to or greater than 65/100 coverage, the premium subsidy is equal to 50/75 coverage. This subsidy is capped at 50/75. This works out on average to roughly a 42 percent premium subsidy at the 65/100 level, 32 percent subsidy at the 70/100 level, and 23 percent subsidy at the 75/100 level in 1998.

Federal program expenses are: total indemnities minus farmer paid premium/fees net of underwriting gains plus administrative payments. In the aggregate, it is really that simple. For example, for crop year 1998 (as of March 1, 1999) total indemnities equaled $1.585 billion, farmer paid premium net of underwriting gains was $681 million and the administrative expenses were $439 million. This sum, $1.344 billion is the total Federal program cost for crop year 1998 (note for budgeting purposes, it must be converted to a fiscal year basis).

WHAT IS MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION?

Moral hazard is a euphemism for cheating or ripping off any insurance program. Moral hazard can be particularly troublesome for the crop insurance program because many management decisions made between planting and harvest ultimately impact the grower's production.

Adverse selection occurs when an insured selects coverage levels or plans of insurance knowing that an indemnity is highly likely and the premium rates does not reflect that expectation. Often adverse selection occurs when a new crop insurance plan does not fully appreciate all the risks that the plan is intended to cover. Adverse selection can be detrimental to the program as it increases losses, which are then incorporated in the historical rating data base.

OTHER PLANS OF INSURANCE

GROUP RISK PLAN (GRP)

GRP was designed to address some of the traditional problems of adverse selection and moral hazard associated with the crop insurance program in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The GRP program is based only on county yields, not individual farmer's APH records. Farmers can choose coverage levels between 70 and 90 percent in 5 percent increments of the historic county yield. If the actual county yield, as determined by USDA falls below the guaranteed historical county yield, an indemnity results. This program is most attractive to farmers whose production is closely correlated with county performance. GRP was first introduced in 1993.

GROUP RISK INCOME PROTECTION (GRIP)

GRIP is an area-based revenue insurance product that pays an insured in the event the county revenue per acre falls below the insured's guaranteed revenue. The insured's guarantee is determined by multiplying the expected county revenue by the coverage level chosen by the insured. The expected county revenue is the expected county yield multiplied by the expected price. Coverage levels can be selected between 70 and 90 percent in 5 percent increments. It is available in 1999 in Indiana, Illinois and Iowa for corn and soybeans. Like GRP the program is most attractive to farmers whose production is closely correlated with county performance.

CROP REVENUE COVERAGE (CRC)

CRC was first introduced in 1996. It is a revenue insurance plan. It protects farmers against low prices, low yields or a combination of both. In addition, CRC provides replacement coverage, where revenue coverage can increase during the growing season if prices rise.

Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) is the most popular revenue insurance product on the market today. It guarantees a minimum income per acre by crop. The minimum income is the product of the traditional yield guaranteed under the existing MPCI insurance program times the higher of a base price (price established before planting) or a harvest price. Both the base and harvest price typically are determined from futures contract prices. Because the revenue guarantee calculation uses the higher of the base or harvest price, CRC provides "upside" and "downside" price protection.

Because CRC covers up- and downside price movements, premiums are generally higher than traditional multi-peril insurance, which has a fixed price. The Federal Government currently does not subsidize the component of the premium associated with the price risk. The premium subsidy is capped at the equivalent MPCI subsidy at the MPCI price. If the CRC price were the same as the Government's price election, the farmer's out-of-pocket cost for CRC is roughly 45% greater than the equivalent MPCI coverage. However, the CRC price is not likely to ever be equal to the MPCI price election due to differences in price setting methodologies. Because CRC provides a guarantee based on the higher of two prices, in general (although not always) CRC will provide a higher price guarantee than traditional MPCI. The price differential combined with the current subsidy formula means that the farmer's relative cost for CRC compared to MPCI is actually greater than 45%.

The ability to aggressively market a crop is the principal advantage of crop revenue insurance product with replacement value at harvest. One of the chief concerns of farmers who forward contract the sale of their crop is a major crop failure and the ensuing inability to meet the terms of the forward sale. Farmers can mitigate this risk by purchasing option contracts or by insuring their crop with a revenue insurance product that provides harvest replacement value protection.

INCOME PROTECTION (IP)

IP is a revenue product developed by USDA. It protects farmers against low yields, low prices, or a combination of both. Unlike CRC it does not provide "up-side" price protection. The planting season price is the guaranteed price. The price for IP is set from the futures market for the crop during the planting season. Indemnity payments are paid if the actual revenue falls below the revenue guarantee. Because the Federal Government does not have authority to offer a revenue insurance product on a nationwide basis, IP has been piloted tested in limited counties in various States.

REVENUE ASSURANCE (RA)

RA is the third crop revenue product available in the market. Revenue assurance has been available in Iowa since 1997 for corn and soybeans. The program has been significantly changed for crop year 1999. Beginning in 1999, RA will be available in Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, and South Dakota for corn and soybeans. It is also available in North Dakota for corn, soybeans, and wheat. RA will now use the Chicago Board of Trade prices rather than posted county prices to determine the revenue guarantee. Also, a fall harvest price option is added. The fall harvest price option is identical to CRC coverage. Whole farm coverage is available under RA up to a 80 percent coverage level.

WHOLE FARM OR SCHEDULE F REVENUE INSURANCE

For products without a futures market and those commodities for which insurance is currently not available, a revenue insurance product that protects against revenue decline for the entire revenue of the farm rather than crop-by-crop may be a feasible alternative. USDA will pilot such a product in 1999.

The product, "Adjusted Gross Revenue," will be available in selected counties in four states in 1999. The pilot is intended to test the feasibility of insuring producers who primarily grow crops that are currently not insurable. However, it could be expanded to include crops that are insurable, but for which no futures contract market currently exists. The insurance plan is based on a farmer's previous five years of Schedule F tax information.




Updated House and Senate Committee Member and Staff Lists

HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE
	
COMMITTEE MEMBERS

		    
				PHONE NO.   	 FAX NO.	AG STAFFER
Majority			
Larry Combest (R-19-TX)		225-4005	225-0917	Tom Sell
Bill Barrett (R-3-NE)		225-6435	225-0207	Betsy Croker
John Boehner (R-8-OH)		225-6205	225-0704	Mike Sommers
Thomas Ewing (R-15-IL)		225-2371	225-8071	Jeremy Stump
Bob Goodlatte (R-6-VA)		225-5431	225-9681	Ben Cline
Richard Pombo (R-11-CA)		225-1947	226-0861	Paul Kavinoky
Charles Canady (R-12-FL)	225-1252	225-2279	Karen Williams
Nick Smith (R-7-MI)		225-6276	225-6281	Chad Cummings
Terry Everett (R-2-AL)		225-2901	225-8913	Pelhen Straughn
Frank Lucas (R-6-OK)		225-5565	225-8698	Nicole Scott
Helen Chenoweth (R-1-ID)	225-6611	225-3029	Matt Miller
John Hostettler (R-8-IN)	225-4636	225-3284	Carl Little
Saxby Chambliss (R-8-GA)	225-6531	225-3031	Christy Cromley
Ray LaHood (R-18-IL)		225-6201	225-9249	Chris Guibry
Jerry Moran (R-1-KS)		225-2715	225-5124	Jon Hixson
Bob Schaffer (R-4-CO)		225-4676	225-5870	Cory Slohr
John Thune (R-AL-SD)		225-2801	225-5823	Robert Fouberg
William Jenkins (R-1-TN)	225-6356	225-5714	Megan Caldwell
John Cooksey (R-5-LA)		225-8490	225-5639	John Dimos
Ken Calvert (R-43-CA)		225-1986	225-2004	Jolyn Murphy
Gil Gutknecht (R-1-MN)		225-2472	225-3246	Sam Willett
Bob Riley (R-3-AL)		225-3261	225-5827	Jon Heroux
Greg Walden (R-2-OR)		225-6730	225-5774	Brian Hard
Mike Simpson (R-2-ID)		225-5531	225-8216	Shannon McMurprey
Doug Ose (R-3-CA)		225-5716	226-1298	Matt Meagher
Robin Hayes (R-8-NC)		225-3715	225-4036	Kyla Sell
Ernest Fletcher (R-6-KY)	225-4706	225-2122	Brenda Janowiak

Minority			
Charles Stenholm (D-17-TX)	225-6605	225-2234	Shannon Sneary
George Brown Jr. (D-42-CA)	225-6161	225-8671	Neisa Ball
Gary Condit (D-18-CA)		225-6131	225-0819	Robert Guenther
Collin Peterson (D-7-MN)	225-2165	225-1593	Rob Larew
Calvin Dooley (D-20-CA)		225-3341	225-9308	Emily Beizer
Eva Clayton (D-1-NC)		225-3101	225-3354	Susan Kelly
David Minge (D-2-MN)		225-2331	226-0836	Christina Muedeking
Earl Hilliard (D-7-AL)		225-2665	226-0772	Mathew Lyons
Earl Pomeroy (D-AL-ND)		225-2611	226-0893	Shawn Psass
Tim Holden (D-6-PA)		225-5546	226-0996	Jennifer Saraceno
Sanford Bishop Jr. (D-2-GA)	225-3631	225-2203	Ken Keck
Bennie Thompson (D-2-MS)	225-5876	225-5898	Walter Vinson
John Baldacci (D-2-ME)		225-6306	225-2943	Ned Porter
Marion Berry (D-1-AR)		225-4076	225-5602	Paul Charton
Virgil Goode (D-5-VA)		225-4711	225-5681	Tom Hance
Mike McIntyre (D-7-NC)		225-2731	225-5773	Bill Bondshu
Debbie Stabenow (D-8-MI)	225-4872	225-5820	Kim Love
Christopher John (D-7-LA)	225-2031	225-5724	Gordon Taylor
Leonard Boswell (D-3-IA)	225-3806	225-5608	Jon Murphy
David Phelps (D-9-IL)		225-5201	225-1541	Kristen Nicholson
Ken Lucas (D-4-KY)		225-3465	225-0003	Colleen Monahan
Mike Thompson (D-1-CA)		225-3311	225-4335	Tom Lafaille
Baron Hill (D-9-IN)		225-5315	226-6866	Meagan Peden




HOUSE AG COMMITTEE KEY STAFF
	
		
				PHONE NO.		AG STAFFER
Majority			
Staff Director			225-2171		William O'Conner 
Senior Professional Staff	225-2171		Pete Thomson 
Professional Staff 		225-2171		Jason Vaillancourt
Chief Counsel 			225-2171		Lance Kotchwar
Associate Counsel 		225-2171		Gregory Zerzan 
Communications Director 	225-3329		Keith Williams  
Committee Administrator 	225-2171		Diane Keyser 
Press Secretary			225-6730		Christopher Matthews  
Senior Professional Staff	225-2342		Dave Ebersole 
Senior Professional Staff	225-0029		Lynn Gallagher 
Legislative Assistant 		225-2171		Ryan Flynn 
Director, Information Sys.	225-0172		Merrick Munday 
Prof. Staff Member, Att.	225-2342		David Tenny 
Committee Hearing Clerk 	225-2342		Wanda Worsham 
Asst. Hearing Clerk		225-0029		Callista Bisek 
Printing Editor 		225-2183		James Cahill 
Legislative Assistant 		225-4927		Brent Gattis 
Legislative Assistant 		225-2342		Monique Brown 
Legislative Clerk 		225-9384		Debbie Smith 

Minority
Minority Legislative
Director, Counsel		225-0420		Laverne Hubert 
Minority Staff Director 	225-0317		Stephen Haterius 
Minority Press Coordinator 	225-0317		John Haugen
Minority Economist 		225-2349		Howard Conley  
Minority Consultant 		225-1496		Russell Middleton 
Minority Consultant 		225-8903		Beau Greenwood 
Minority Consultant 		225-4453		Danelle Farmer 
Minority Office Manager 	225-0317		Sharon Rusnak 
Minority Staff Assistant 	225-7987		John Riley  




GENERAL FARM COMODITIES, RESEARCH CONSERVATION AND CREDIT SUB-COMTE MEMBERS
	

Chairman - Bill Barrett (R-3-NE)  Phone:  225-6435	
		
Majority			
John Boehner (R-8-OH)		225-6205		
Nick Smith (R-7-MS)		225-6276		
Frank Lucas (R-6-OK)		225-5565		
Saxby Chambliss (R-8-GA)	225-6531		
Jerry Moran (R-1-KS)		225-2715		
John Thune (R-al-SD)		225-2801
William Jenkins (R-1-TN)	225-6356
Doug Ose (R-3-CA)		225-5716
Robin Hayes (R-8-NC)		225-3715

Minority	
David Minge (D-2-MN)		225-2331
Bennie Thompson (D-2-MS)	225-5876
David Phelps (D-19-IL)		225-5201
Baron Hill (D-9-IN)		225-5315
Eva Clayton (D-1-NC)		225-3101
Earl Pomeroy (D-al-ND)		225-2611
Tim Holden (D-6-PA)		225-5546
Sanford Bishop (D-2-GA)		225-3631
John Baldacci (D-2-ME)		225-6306

			
			

GENERAL FARM COMODITIES, RESEARCH CONSERVATION AND CREDIT SUB-COMTE STAFF
	
		
Majority
Mike Neruda, Director		225-0171		
Russell Laird			225-0171		
Moorhead Hunter			225-0171	
	
Minority	
Andy Baker, Consultant		225-3069		
Anne Simmons			225-1494		
			



LIVESTOCK AND HORTICULTURE SUB-COMMITTEE MEMBERS	
		

Chairman - Richard Pombo (R-11-CA)  PHONE:  225-1947
		
Majority			
John Boehner (R-8-OH) 		225-6205		
Bob Goodlatte (R-6-VA)		225-5431		
Terry Everett (R-2-AL)		225-2901		
Frank Lucas (R-6-OK)		225-5565		
Helen Chenoweth (R-1-ID)	225-6611		
John Hostettler (R-8-IN)	225-4636		
Bob Schaffer (R-4-CO)		225-4676		
Ken Calvert (R-43-CA)		225-1986		
Gil Gutknecht (R-1-MN)		225-2472		
Bob Riley (R-3-AL)		225-3261	
	
Minority			
Collin Peterson (D-7-MN)	225-2165		
Tim Holden (D-6-PA)		225-5546		
Gary Condit (D-18-CA)		225-6131		
Calvin Dooley (D-20-CA)		225-3341		
Marion Berry (D-1-AR)		225-4076		
Mike McIntyre (D-7-NC)		225-2731		
Debbie Stabenow (D-8-MI)	225-4872		
Bob Etheridge (D-2-NC)		225-4531		
Leonard Boswell (D-3-IA)	225-3806		
Ken Lucas (D-4-KY)		225-3465		
		
	


LIVESTOCK AND HORTICULTURE SUB-COMMITTEE KEY STAFF
		
	
Majority			225-1564		Christopher D'Arcy, Director

Minority			225-6395		Andy Johnson, Professional Staff
		
	


RISK MANAGEMENT, RESEARCH AND SPECIALTY CROPS SUB-COMMITTEE MEMBERS	
		

Chairman - Thomas Ewing (R-15-IL)  Phone:  224-2371
			
Majority			
Bill Barrett (R-3-NE)		225-6435		
Nick Smith (R-7-MI)		225-6276		
Terry Everett (R-2-AL)		225-2901		
Frank Lucas (D-6-OK)		225-5565		
Saxby Chambliss (R-8-GA)	225-6531		
Ray LaHood (R-18-IL)		225-6201		
Jerry Moran (R-1-KS)		225-2715		
John Thune (R-al-SD)		225-2801
William Jenkins (R-1-TN)	225-6356
Gil Gutnecht (R-1-MN)		225-2472
Bob Riley (R-3-AL)		225-3261
Greg Walden (R-2-OR)		225-6730
Michael Simpson (R-2-ID)	225-5531
Doug Ose (R-3-CA)		225-5716
Robin Hayes (R-8-NC)		225-3715
Ernie Fletcher (R-6-KY)		225-4706

Minority
Gary Condit (D-18-CA)		225-6131
George Brown (D-42-CA)		225-6161
Calvin Dooley (D-20-CA)		225-3341
Earl Hilliard (D-7-AL)		225-2665
Earl Pomery (D-al-ND)		225-2611
Sanford Bishop (D-2-GA)		225-3631
John Baldacci (D-2-ME)		225-6306		
Virgil Goode (D-5-VA)		225-4711		
Mike McIntyre (D-7-NC)		225-3021		
Debbie Stabenow (D-8-MI)	225-4872		
Bob Etheridge (D-2-NC)		225-4531		
Christopher John (D-7-LA)	225-2031		
Leonard Boswell (D-3-IA)	225-3806		
Ken Lucas (D-4-KY)		225-3465		
Mike Thompson (D-1-CA)		225-3311		
		

	

RISK MANAGEMENT, RESEARCH AND SPECIALTY CROPS SUB-COMMITTEE KEY STAFF
	
		
Majority			225-4652		Stacy Carey

Minority			225-7987		John Riley
			



DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS, OVERSIGHT, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY SUB-COMTE MEMBERS	
		

Chairman - Bob Goodlatte (R-6-VA)  Phone:  225-5431	
		
Majority	
Thomas Ewing (R-15-IL)		225-2371
Richard Pombo (R-11-CA)		225-1947
Charles Canady (R-12-FL)	225-1252
Hohn Hostettler (R-8-IN)	225-4636
Saxby Chambliss (R-8-GA)	225-6531
Ray LaHood (R-18-IL)		226-6201
Jerry Moran (R-1-KS)		225-2715
John Cooksey (R-5-LA)		225-8490
Greg Walden (R-2-OR)		225-6730

Minority	
Eva Clayton (D-1-NC)		225-3101
Marion Berry (D-1-AR)		225-4076
Bennie Thompson (D-2-MS)	225-5876
Virgil Goode (D-5-VA)		225-2711
David Phelps (D-19-IL)		225-5201
Baron Hill (D-9-IN)		225-5315		
Mike Thompson (D-1-CA)		225-3311		
George Brown (D-42-CA)		225-6161		
David Minge (D-2-MN)		225-2331		
			



DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS, OVERSIGHT, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY SUB-COMTE KEY STAFF
 	
		
Majority			225-0171		Kevin Kramp

Minority			225-9381		Danelle Farmer
			
		
	

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
			

AGRICULTURE SUB-COMMITTEE MEMBERS
	
		
				PHONE NO.	FAX NO.		AG STAFFERS
Majority
Joe Skeen (R-2-NM)		225-2365	225-9599	Jim Richards
James Walsh (R-25-NY)		225-3701	225-4042	Ron Anderson
Jay Dickey (R-4-AR)		225-3772	225-1314	Brian Casal
Jack Kingston (R-1-GA)		225-5831	226-2269	Diana Burns
George Nethercutt(R-5-WA)	225-2006	225-3392	Jack Silvel
Henry Bonilla (R-23-TX)		225-4511	225-2237	Tamara Daniel
Tom Latham (R-5-IA)		225-5476	225-3301	Michael Gruber
Jo Ann Emerson (R-8-MO)		225-4404	226-0326	Ceaber Sowers

Minority			
Marcy Kaptur (D-9-OH)		225-4146	225-7711	Bobbi Jeanquart
Rosa DeLauro (D-3-CT)		225-3661	225-4890	Sarah Walkling
Maurice Hinchey (D-26-NY)	225-6335	226-0774	Diane Miller
Sam Farr (D-17-CA)		225-2861	225-6791	Troy Phillips
Allen Boyd Jr. (D-2-FL)		225-5235	225-5615	Charla Penn




AG APPROPRIATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE KEY STAFF
			
Majority			
Staff Assistant			225-2638	225-2535	Henry Moore
Staff Assistant			225-2638	225-2535	Martin Delgado
Staff Assistant			225-2638	225-2535	John Ziolkowski
Administrative Aide		225-2638	225-2535	Joanne Orndorff

Minority			
Minority Staff Assistant	225-3481		Sally Chadbourne




SENATE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE
				

COMMITTEE MEMBERS
		
	
				PHONE NO.	FAX NO.		AG STAFFER
Majority
Richard Lugar (R-IN)		224-4814			Committee Staff (224-2035)
Jess Helms (R-NC)		224-6342	228-1339	David Rouzer
Thad Cochran (R-MS)		224-5054	224-9450	Hunt Shipman
Mitch McConnell (R-KY)		224-2541	224-2499	Mason Wiggins
Paul Coverdell (R-GA)		224-3643	228-4833	Richard Gupton
Pat Roberts (R-KS)		224-4774	224-3514	Mike Seyfert
Peter Fitztgerald (R-IL)	224-2854	228-1372	Terry Van Doren
Charles Grassley (R-IA)		224-3744	224-6020	Julie Manes
Larry Craig (R-ID)		224-2752	228-1067	Wayne Hammon
Rick Santorum (R-PA)		224-6324	228-0604	Jill Hershey

Minority			
Tom Harkin (D-IA)		224-3254	225-4876	Mark Halverson
Patrick Leahy (D-VT)		224-4242	224-3479	Susan Fleek
Kent Conrad (D-MD)		224-2043	224-7776	Scott Carlson
Thomas Daschle (D-SD)		224-2321	224-2047	Zabrae Valentine
Max Baucus (D-MT)		224-2651	224-3687	Angela Marshall
Bob Kerrey (D-NE)		224-6551	224-7645	Bev Paul
Tim Johnson (D-SD)		224-5842	228-5765	Brian Jennings
Blance Lincoln (D-AR)		224-4843	228-1371	Ben Noble




SENATE AG COMMITTEE KEY STAFF
		
	
Majority			
Staff Director			224-2035		Keith Luce
Chief Clerk			224-2035		Robert Sturm
Chief Counsel, 
Assistant Staff Dir.		224-2035		David Johnson
Counsel				224-2035		Marcia Asquith
Counsel				224-2035		Michael Knipe
Chief Economist			224-2035		Andrew Morton
Press Secretary						Vacant
Administrative/Financial Clerk				Vacant
GPO Editor			224-2035		Barbara Ward
GAO Detailee			224-2035		Vacant
Sen. Prof. Staff Mem.		224-2035		Terri Nintemann
Sen. Prof. Staff Mem.		224-2035		Bob White
Prof. Staff Member		224-2035		Carol Dubard
Prof. Staff Member		224-2035		Walt Lukken
Prof. Staff Member		224-2035		Terri Snow
Prof. Staff Member		224-2035		Daniel Spellacy
Prof. Staff Member		224-2035		Katherine Wallem
Leg. Correspondent		224-2035		Kathryn Hammond
Staff Assistant			224-2035		Varshawn Perkins
Hearing Clerk			224-2035		Chris Salisbury

Minority 			
Minority Staff Director		224-2035		Daniel Smith
Minortiy Economist		224-2035		Stephanie Mercier
Min. Prof. Staff Member		224-2035		Andrew Fish
Min. Prof. Staff Member		224-2035		Vacant
Min. Counsel			224-2035		Mark Halverson
Min. Leg. Staff Asst.		224-2035		Molly Murray


			

SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
			

AG APPROPRIATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE MEMBERS
	
		
			PHONE NO.	FAX NO.		AG STAFFERS
Majority
Thad Cochran (R-MS)		224-5054		Hunt Shipman
Arlen Specter (R-PA)		224-4254		Kevin Mathis
Christopher Bond (R-MO)		224-5721		Brian Klippenstein
Slade Gorton (R-WA)		224-3441		Liz Wood
Mitch McConnell (R-KY)		224-2541		Mason Wiggins
Conrad Burns (R-MT)		224-2644		Sonya Voldseth

Minority 			
Herb Kohl (D-WI)		224-5653		Mark Rokala
Tom Harkin (D-IA)		224-3254		Mark Halverson
Bryan Dorgan (D-ND)		224-2551		Carl Limevere
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)		224-3841		Matt Miller
Richard Durbin (D-IL)		224-2152		Pat Souders




AG APPROPRIATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE KEY STAFF
 			
Majority			
Clerk				224-7219		Rebecca Davis
Professional Staff Member	224-2836		Martha Poindexter
Staff Assistant			224-5270		Lee Spivey

Minority			
Minority Clerk			224-7202		Galen Fountain
Minority Staff Assistant	224-7240		Carole Geagley